The paper is divided into two parts.
The first describes some elements of negative liberty, while the
second some aspects of positive liberty. Though the discussion is far
from finished, it is a good beginning to the initial question.
In describing the difference between
two types of liberty, Berlin provides two initial questions. He
states that negative liberty is concerned with the question: “What
is the area within which the subject...is or should be left to do or
be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other
persons?” (Berlin 1958, 2). Positive liberty, by contrast, is
concerned with the question: “What, or who, is the source of
control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this
rather than that?” (Berlin 1958, 2.). The first is concerned with
the extent to which I should be left alone without interference from
another subject (a person or group of persons), a kind of circle to
be drawn between my area and the area of another. The second, in
turn, is concerned with the question about what or who is the subject
that determines what I can do or be. In his description of the
former, he makes at least two remarks about the nature of negative
liberty, which also help speak to its desirability.
First, he states that political liberty in the negative sense entails a kind of freedom from coercion. Coercion simply means that a subject has prevented me from doing or being what I would otherwise do or be beyond a certain minimum. However, freedom from this obstruction does not encompass all forms of inability, like natural inability. If I am prevented from being able to do something by nature like jump or run, I cannot say that I am coerced. For him, coercion “...implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area within which I could otherwise act” (Berlin 1958, 3). Even in theories regarding economic oppression, like those of Marx, where people are said to be unfree if they cannot afford material goods in a particular economic system, “The criterion of oppression is the part...to be played by other human beings, directly or indirectly, with or without the intention of doing so, in frustrating [one's] wishes” (Berlin 1958, 3). Negative freedom, then, means an area of non-interference for the subject where the greater the area, the greater the freedom (Berlin 1958, 3).
Traditionally in the literature on freedom (as in authors like Mill), the reason why a minimum area of non-interference must exist for the individual is that “...if it is overstepped, the individual will find himself in an area too narrow for even that minimum development of his natural faculties which alone makes it possible to pursue, and even to conceive, the various ends which men hold good or right or sacred” (Berlin 1958, 3). Berlin agrees that freedom is something valuable, but he takes issue with this claim. Empirically, it's true that integrity, love of truth and other values have flourished within rather authoritarian communities, like among the military, in contexts in which freedom from interference is rather small (Berlin 1958, 6). This demonstrates that the value of freedom is perhaps not rooted in the development of natural faculties or values but rather autonomy. In discussing Kant's conception of the individual, for instance, he seems not merely to indicate but agree that “...if the essence of men is that they are autonomous beings -authors of values, of ends in themselves, the ultimate authority of which consists precisely in the fact that they are willed freely - then nothing is worse than to treat them as if they were not autonomous, but natural objects, played on by causal influences, creatures at the mercy of external stimuli, whose choices can be manipulated by their rulers, whether by threats of force or offers of rewards” (Berlin 1958, 11). His comment is situated in the context of demonstrating why a positive conception of freedom is so dangerous, but this point has merit because there is something to being one's own author of values and ultimate authority, otherwise the fact that a tyrant can treat the individual otherwise is of no concern. The value of negative freedom for Berlin, then, appears to be in simply the value of following one's own ends and plan in life and less about the ability to do so for the sake of other values or the development of natural abilities within a wide-range of non-interference.
Second,
Berlin distinguishes freedom as a value from others like justice or
equality. It
is true that sometimes a society must choose between competing values
like freedom and equality, where there is a loss of some for the sake
of the latter. But, as he puts it: “Everything is what it is:
liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture,
or human happiness
or a quiet conscience” (Berlin
1958, 5). If
that's true, then a loss of freedom for the sake of another value is
never a gain in freedom itself.
There are two important remarks to be made about these two aspects of Berlin's notion of negative freedom. The first is that Berlin's notion of liberty appears to be too atomistic to the point of absurdity. Essentially, because freedom is freedom and justice is justice, I can never equate freedom with justice or justice with freedom. That means that it appears impossible to make statements like, “Some loss of negative liberty is just or it is just to have some loss of negative liberty.” I seem only to be able to say, “There has been a loss in negative liberty and a gain in justice.”
But this is not just a semantic point. It would appear equally absurd if I thought justice had nothing to do with freedom, that in a just society, you can accept freedom or equality or leave freedom or equality aside. Freedom and equality are elements of justice, without which it would be strange to talk about justice at all, for it would make the concept vacuous. Rawls' conception of justice, for instance, also involves liberties and a principle of material equality. If justice is not also in part freedom and equality, what then is justice?
Similarly, values are often so tied together that to talk about one is to automatically talk about the other. For instance, even if I believe that negative freedom means an area of non-interference for the individual, I might still believe that an arrangement has been made so that others in society through their status and actions prevent me (even unintentionally) from doing what I would do in the absence of that interference. But in turn, in describing that arrangement, I'm describing a society of a particular kind of equality or inequality which indirectly or directly has an effect on my area of non-interference. Equality and freedom, in other words, are inextricably linked. To talk about a decrease in inequality is to talk about the expansion of my area in which I can do or be this or that. At the same time, describing the expansion of my area of non-interference means describing also a change in the structure of equality or inequality. It might be the case that in order to have a great deal of negative liberty for everyone, there must be a greater equality of resources in society for everyone. It might be true that the concepts can momentarily be separated (just as when people talk about class and race and gender separately), but they are inevitably inextricably tied. Berlin assumes the two are distinct, and from that assumption, he argues for the necessity sometimes of having to forsake negative liberty for equality or justice or how it would be an insult to not offer certain material necessities for the exercise of negative liberty (but that negative liberty is nevertheless distinct) (Berlin 1958, 4).
In terms of desirability, it would appear that if freedom is valuable, other values must also be and vice versa. In fact, it would appear odd to say that equality or justice is unimportant to most people, because these determine people's comfort in life and also the area in which they can act. Greater material goods for me, for instance, mean a greater area where people do not prevent me from not being able to travel or buy what I want, and I want to travel and buy lots of things. The desirability of negative freedom, then, is also linked to the desirability of other values, and this is what makes negative freedom valuable.
Second, there is an element of inconsistency within the claims he makes here and the claims he makes in the latter parts of the essay concerning the vicissitudes of positive liberty. Specifically, the first aspect of negative liberty seems to contradict his claims about the harm in thinking there is some kind of universal reason which can be applied to all subjects by an authority. Essentially, Berlin's own claims about what negative liberty is and its value must somehow accord with a view of a universal kind of reason if his claims are to be taken seriously at all. However, to see this, it is first necessary to describe briefly the concept of positive liberty.
The positive notion of liberty is best described by Berlin when he states:
The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer - deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realising them (Berlin 1958, 8).
In other words, unlike the negative notion of liberty that asks for a certain degree of non-interference in relation to the question: “what is the degree to which I should be allowed to be or do this without obstruction?,” the positive notion asks who should be in charge of telling me what I should do or be. The answer in this tradition is myself. I should not be moved by impulsive irrational desires or tyrants telling me what to do. I should be self-determining. However, as Berlin makes clear, this master or higher self “...is then variously identified with reason, with my 'higher nature,' with the self which calculates and aims at what will satisfy it in the long run, with my 'real,' or or 'ideal,' or 'autonomous self', or with my self 'at its best'...”(Berlin 1958, 8). Although he doesn't list it there, Aristotle comes to mind, whose philosophy urges taming the irrational part of human nature by the rational according to virtue. Our best selves should determine the course of our lives, and this best self is associated with reason.
There are several problems with this view, which Berlin makes clear in the parts that follow. But the one that is relevant for my purposes is where he talks about “self-realization.” The positive notion of liberty implies that “The only true method of attaining freedom...is by the use of critical reason, the understanding of what is necessary and what is contingent” (Berlin 1958, 14). In other words, the idea is that if reason is the higher self which allows self-mastery, it must itself be trained to understand the world, to be “educated” in some sense, for all to use a kind of universal reason, which would be available to all (Berlin 1958, 15-18). But this idea can become abused easily by the state quickly. In trying to “educate” you, make you become more rational against your irrational tendencies, suddenly the state can lay claim as to what is good for you and what is not in the name of rationality. But, as Berlin argues:
This is the argument used by every dictator, inquisitor and bully who seeks some moral, or even aesthetic, justification for his conduct. I must do for men (or with them) what they cannot do for themselves, and I cannot ask their permission or consent, because they are in no condition to know what is best for them; indeed, what they will permit and accept may mean a life of contemptible mediocrity, or perhaps even their ruin and suicide (Berlin 1958, 19).
Berlin's claim, in other words, has merit. Though he doesn't mention it, this has been the excuse of the state to violate the rights of individuals and groups in Canada, for instance, in residential schools. The idea was that savages needed to become educated and rational, civilized, often against their wishes. It is also the excuse for rights violations under the guise of mental health, where people are drugged and imprisoned against their wills, in order to make them rationally sane, because they do not know what's good for themselves, only the authority working towards this universal education of citizens. Hence, Berlin is skeptical about this universal reason that will lead people to become masters of their own destiny, to fulfill a positive notion of freedom. He thinks instead the ends of people are many, and that we must respect their pursuit of their own ends (Berlin 1958, 30). As he states: “Pluralism, with the measure of 'negative' liberty that it entails, seems to me a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek in the great disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of 'positive' self-mastery by classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind” (Berlin 1958, 31).
The problem with this, however, is that I might ask: why should I take anything you have said so far seriously? Why should I agree with your critique of positive liberty in favour of negative liberty? Surely, the answer will be simply everything rational that Berlin has said so far, his arguments for the dangers of positive liberty and the value of negative liberty. But if there is no universal kind of reason which will ensure our own self-mastery, Berlin's claims are just another rational argument among many. However, I think he wants to say more than that. He wants his claims to appeal to any rational person trying to ascertain what positive liberty and negative are, and which is desirable beyond simply another perspective among many. In other words, in giving up on the idea of a universal kind of reason, he helps weaken his own claims because the real “pull” that comes from an argument is not just that it's another perspective in a vast universe of rational perspectives, but that it's a true one, one that brings people closer to understanding the actual state of the world and what it should be.
In fact, in some places, Berlin seems not to argue against positive liberty completely but only make us aware of the vicissitudes sometimes associated with it. In turn this could mean that he does not actually give up (at least implicitly) on the entire notion of a universal form of reason, a rationality that could solve all problems in political philosophy, although he seems to in the aforementioned parts. For instance, he states in the final part of his essay:
I do not wish to say that individual freedom [negative liberty?] is, even in the most liberal societies, the sole, or even the dominant, criterion of social action. We compel children to be educated, and we forbid public executions. These are certainly curbs to freedom. We justify them on the ground that ignorance, or a barbarian upbringing, or cruel pleasures and excitements are worse for us than the amount of restraint needed to repress them (Berlin 1958, 30).
Berlin seems to be talking about liberty in relation to other values, like justice, but in that part he also seems to be saying that there is some value to positive liberty. For notice that “compelling children to be educated,” for instance, is a form of positive liberty. That action describes who should tell the individual what he should do and is compatible with the idea that people should be masters of their own lives through educating them to be rational, which are parts of positive liberty. In other words, it appears that Berlin also believes positive liberty has merit.
It would be strange, furthermore, to argue that positive liberty is without value. Aristotle's philosophy on living a virtuous life, for instance, is a clear case of positive liberty. It argues for self-mastery of the rational parts of our mind over the irrational, but with the aim of living life more fruitfully. Vice, for instance, is rightfully thought to lead to ill health or imbalance. Eating too much or drinking too much causes this. Cowering from speaking one's mind in times when it is necessary (perhaps in a time of racial injustice, for instance) helps perpetuate harm to society, while courage in these matters appears to help improve people's lives. A little self-mastery, in other words, actually may help people live better. In fact, this may even widen people's scope of negative liberty, for in trying to lead rational lives, people might come to realize that they also would benefit and wish for a wide-range of non-interference by others. Racialized people in their pursuit of rational self-mastery, for instance, might struggle for a society where they are not oppressed by others through segregation or lack of political rights, actions which limit what racialized people can do without interference. The two liberties, in other words, might not only be intertwined but equally desirable.
These two remarks about the two aspects of negative liberty Berlin describes in the end help show the desirability of both kinds of liberty. Negative liberty seems desirable because it accords with a seemingly true conception of human kind as somehow autonomous but also because it is inextricably tied to other values like justice or equality which are valuable to us as well. Why these are valuable to us, of course, requires further thought. But prima facie, they appear to be important because they affect our lives as self-determining people. As I said, the level of equality will also affect the level of negative freedom I have and vice versa.
Moreover, it would be strange to think that negative liberty is the only desirable form of liberty because for that claim to be true, in even the accurate description of what negative liberty is, this rational argument must be capable of persuading all people in a kind of universally rational sense. It's not just that an argument for negative liberty is just another rational argument, it's that it is true in a way that would appeal to all rational people. To say otherwise is perhaps not completely contradictory, but it is somewhat self-defeating. Of course, that said, Berlin is right in describing the vicissitude of positive liberty, that is, it's undesirability in some sense. But that certainly is not a conclusive argument against positive liberty entirely. As I said, even he himself seems to acknowledge that positive liberty has merit.
There is much more to be said about the nature and desirability of negative and positive liberty. For instance, Berlin describes the problem with positive liberty's “retreat inward” and how it's difficult to gauge exactly what the sphere of negative liberty is or should be. Nevertheless, these remarks on its nature and goodness are worth considering.
Bibliography
Berlin, I. (1958) "Two Concepts of Liberty." In Isaiah Berlin (1969) Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
